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Monetary Dialogue 2009–2014:  
Looking Backward, Looking Forward
Sylvester Eijffinger1*
Abstract
When comparing the transparency of the ECB now with the transparency of the 
ECB about one decade ago, we notice that transparency still can be improved in 
a few ways. In particular the disclosure related to the ways decisions are reached 
and the disclosure on its policy (what is the envisioned path of policy?) could be 
improved. We call for action and in particular we suggest to release minutes and 
voting records, while also engaging in more explicit and concrete forward 
guidance. At the same time, we call for a reflection on the institutional setup of 
the ECB. This is less urgent than the reform with respect to transparency, but in 
the medium term a necessary exercise. We believe that also in the 8th term of the 
European Parliament, the Monetary Dialogue will have a role in spurring the de-
bate and possibly influencing the ECB, as it has done in the past.
Monetärer Dialog 2009–2014:  
Ein Rückblick und eine Vorausschau
Zusammenfassung
Wenn man die jetzige Transparenz der EZB mit der von vor einem Jahrzehnt 
vergleicht, dann stellt man fest, dass diese immer noch in einigen Punkten verbes-
serungswürdig ist. Insbesondere sollte verstärkt offengelegt werden wie die Ent-
scheidungsfindung vonstattengeht und welche Politik verfolgt wird (wie stellt 
sich die EZB den zukünftigen Verlauf ihrer Politik vor?). Wir schlagen zur Verbes-
serung vor, dass ausführliche Protokolle und auch Wahlergebnisse veröffentlicht 
werden. Gleichermaßen soll die Vorausschau auf zukünftige Politiken („forward 
guidance“) expliziter erläutert werden. Zur gleichen Zeit rufen wir dazu auf, dass 
der institutionelle Rahmen der EZB überdacht wird. Dies ist zwar weniger drin-
gend im Vergleich zu einer größeren Transparenz, aber auf mittlere Sicht dennoch 
notwendig. Wir glauben außerdem, dass in der achten Legislaturperiode des Eu-
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ropäischen Parlaments der monetäre Dialog weiterhin die Debatte befeuern wird 
und damit Einfluss auf die EZB nehmen kann. 
Keywords: Central Bank Transparency, Central Bank Communication, Macroeco-
nomic Policy
JEL Classification: E58, G20, O11
I. Background
With the end of the 7th legislative term of the European Parliament in 
sight, this note reflects on the workings of the Monetary Dialogue. The 
Monetary Dialogue has its origins in the European Parliament Resolution 
on democratic accountability in the third phase of the EMU of 4 may 
1998.1 The Monetary Dialogue was founded to provide a platform for dis-
cussion between the European Parliament and the European Central 
Bank (ECB). At the same time the Monetary Dialogue supports democrat-
ic accountability. One of the hallmarks of modern Central Banking is the 
(political) independence of Central Banks.2 In a democratic environment 
independence needs to be balanced by accountability. Accountability re-
quires disclosure because correct and sufficient information regarding the 
behavior of the Central Bank is necessary to evaluate the performance. 
The dialogue is in this way conducive to accountability of the ECB.
In this note we reflect on the workings of the ECB and on potential im-
provements. In particular we emphasize issues related to accountability, 
transparency and communication. Communication is one way to achieve 
transparency which is, as argued above, necessary for accountability. Our 
assessment suggests that the ECB could improve with respect to the pro-
cedural dimension and the policy dimension. The former term refers to 
the way decisions are reached, the latter term refers to what the policy 
outlook is for the future and how the ECB expects its policy to influence 
interest rates.
We end our note with a call for reflecting on the institutional design of 
the ECB as well. While less urgent than the suggested improvement in 
terms of transparency, we feel that the Monetary Dialogue is an excellent 
1 European Parliament (1998), Resolution on democratic accountability in the 
third phase of EMU of 4 may 1998. http: / / eur-lex.europa.eu / LexUriServ / Lex 
UriServ.do?uri=CELEX:51998IP0110:EN:HTML.
2 There is an enormous academic and policy literature on this issue. See for 
 example Eijffinger, S. / de Haan, J. (1996), The Political Economy of Central Bank 
Independence, Special papers in International Economics.
 Looking Backward, Looking Forward 3
Credit and Capital Markets 1 / 2015
venue to reflect on the institutional setup of the ECB as the Central Bank 
is maturing.
II. Transparency and Disclosure
Before discussing the performance and evolution of the ECB in terms 
of transparency and disclosure, we develop some concepts.3
Central Bank disclosure (i. e. the information provided by the Central 
Bank) and transparency of monetary policy (i. e. public’s understanding 
of the monetary policy process) are interrelated. Figure 1 provides a styl-
ized account of this relationship.
The Figure shows how the Central Bank reaches a decision on the basis 
of its strategy which is communicated to the outside. The public receives 
its information primarily through the media which use the communica-
tion by the Central Bank as input. The effect of Monetary Policy is deter-
mined not only by the decisions but also by the expectations and behav-
iour of the public. 
3 A fully developed treatment of these issues can be found in de Haan, J. / Eij­
ffinger, S. / Waller, S. (2005), The European Central Bank: Credibility, transparency 
and centralization. Cesifo Book Series. 
Objectives 
Input (raw data) 
Central Bank Strategy     Output (decisions) 
  
Communication about strategy (disclosure) 
(activities, contents) 
             Outcomes 
Reporting about strategy by Intermediaries 
 
Public’s understanding (transparency)              Behavior 
Source: de Haan, J. / Eijffinger, S. / Waller, S. (2005), p. 85; adapted from Winkler (2000).
Figure 1: Monetary Policy Strategy and Communication.
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It is clear that communication is key in this story because it has a big 
impact on transparency. Transparency and disclosure are however multi-
faceted concepts which could pertain to different aspects of economic 
policy making. Following Geraats (2000, 2002), we distinguish five di-
mensions of disclosure. An overview is given in Table 1. 
A first dimension is political disclosure which refers to the preferences 
of the policy makers. Sufficient disclosure could reduce uncertainty 
about these preferences. Additionally, institutional arrangements like 
Central Bank independence and override mechanisms contribute to po-
litical transparency as they clarify the relationship between the govern-
ment and the Central Bank. Secondly, we have economic disclosure which 
means transparency on the economic data and models used in guiding 
policy. In the past, academics have focused on disclosing economic shocks 
and forecasts. Thirdly, we have procedural disclosure which pertains to 
the way decisions are reached. Transparency in this dimension can be 
achieved by providing guidance on how decisions came about. The pub-
Table 1
Dimensions of disclosure
Five dimensions of disclosure:
Dimension: Meaning: Enhanced by:
Political 
disclosure






models and methods used
Procedural 
Disclosure







prompt announcement of decision




contol errors in achieving the
monetary policy targets
Source: de Haan, J. / Eijffinger, S. / Waller, S. (2005), p. 86–87.
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lication of minutes, transcripts or voting records can be instrumental in 
achieving procedural transparency. A fourth dimension is policy disclo-
sure. This refers the prompt announcement of the policy decision. Finally 
we have operational disclosure. This relates to the implementation of 
Central Bank policy and in particular it involves a discussion of control 
errors in achieving the operating targets of monetary policy and macro-
economic disturbances affecting the transmission process.
De Haan / Eijffinger / Waller (2005) provide some evidence on the perfor-
mance of several Central Banks on these different dimensions.4 With re-
spect to political disclosure and economic disclosure the ECB scores his-
torically very well and belong s to the best performing Central Banks. 
Also with respect to operational disclosure the EBC performed well. 
However, the performance with respect to procedural disclosure and pol-
icy disclosure was much worse and the ECB received the lowest score in 
a group of nine influential Central Banks.5
The question is then, to what extent has the situation improved? The 
low score with respect to procedural transparency was caused by the ab-
sence of publicly available minutes and voting records. On this aspect we 
have seen little improvement by the ECB. In 2013 there was some discus-
sion on whether minutes (with voting records) should be published. Jörg 
Asmussen and Benoît Cœuré supported in a joint interview the idea of 
publishing these minutes and voting records, but their recommendation 
was not followed by the ECB. Some have argued that publishing the vot-
ing records in the ECB is a bad idea as secrecy shields the voting mem-
bers from harmful influence of national governments. Secrecy in this re-
gard can encourage behavior which promotes well-being of the whole 
union as a whole.6 There is also empirical evidence suggesting that trans-
parency in the voting process induces behavioural changes, see for exam-
ple Meade / Stasavage (2008).7
4 A detailed explanation on and discussion of the (empirical) performance of 
Central Banks with regard to transparency can be found in Eijffinger, S. / Geraats, 
P. (2006) How transparent are Central Banks? European Journal of Political Econ-
omy.
5 de Haan / Eijffinger / Waller (2005), The European Central Bank: Credibility, 
transparency and centralization. Cesifo Book Series. P.94.
6 Gersbach, H. / Hahn, V. (2009), Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union. Jour-
nal of Money, Credit and Banking.
7 Meade, Ellen and Stasavage, David (2008), The dangers of increased transpar-
ency in Monetary Policymaking. Economic Journal.
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If we look at other Central Banks, we see that there is a tendency to 
become more open on this dimension with countries like Sweden or the 
Czech Republic now also releasing their voting records. Major Central 
Banks like the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England already did. 
Our opinion is that improving the procedural transparency is warrant-
ed. It allows the ECB to be easier held accountable. Moreover, the secrecy 
surrounding the procedural dimension seems something from the past. 
The concerns expressed by authors such as Gersbach and Hahn8, should 
be dealt with directly rather than keeping an atmosphere of secrecy. A 
reform of the executive board and governing council could solve the con-
cerns regarding national influences as well. We return to this issue in a 
next section. 
Providing minutes and voting records allows ECB watchers (and by ex-
tension the general public) to analyze and understand decisions.9 More-
over, the increasing importance of the ECB (in part due to other develop-
ments) warrants some measures to hold the institution accountable. 
Transparency of the decision-taking process helps to overcome the dem-
ocratic deficit created by the secrecy surrounding the decision-taking 
process. 
With respect to policy disclosure we feel that there has been some im-
provements. In 2005, de Haan / Eijffinger / Waller (2005) reported that the 
ECB was lacking in communication on the policy inclination as well as 
giving relatively little policy explanation. Nowadays it seems the ECB 
tries to convey more information on its policy trough press statements 
and speeches by Executive board members. However, publishing inclina-
tions regarding the path of future policy interest rates in the spirit of 
Norway, Sweden or New Zealand is not on the table (yet). 
A higher degree of policy disclosure can be obtained by more actively 
engaging in forward guidance. Forward guidance is nowadays a hot topic 
8 Gersbach, H. / Hahn, V. (2009), Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union. Jour-
nal of Money, Credit and Banking.
9 We have recently analyzed the voting records of the Bank of England as well 
as the voting records of some continental Central Banks. Our analysis gave us in-
sight into the different preferences of Central Bankers and how these are related 
to their professional background (e. g. internal vs. external). We could do such an 
analysis only because the voting records are publicly available. See Eijffinger, 
S. / Mahieu, R. / Raes, L. (2013) Inferring hawks and doves from voting records. 
CEPR working paper; Eijffinger, S. / Mahieu, R. / Raes, L. (2013) Estimating the 
preferences of Central Bankers: An analysis of four voting records. CEPR working 
paper.
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in Central Banking and heavily debated among policy makers and aca-
demics.10 A key motivation for forward guidance is provided by Wood­
ford: “Greater clarity within the policy committee itself about the way in 
which policy is expected to be conducted in the future is likely to lead to 
more coherent policy decisions, and greater clarity on the part of the 
public as to how policy will be conducted is likely to improve the degree 
to which the Central Bank can count on achieving the effects that it in-
tends through its policy.”11 While forward guidance and expectations 
management by communication is applied by different Central Banks to 
different extents, it seems often too vague to us. We feel that forward 
guidance should be explicit about the path of interest rates.12 Specifi-
cally, the ECB should communicate the evolution of interest rates it envi-
sions conditional on what the ECB knows. The ECB would then commu-
nicate the evolution it foresees for both short and longer maturities and 
this up to at least one year (or longer if feasible). The idea is that the 
ECB communicates in concrete terms, and clearly, coherently spells out 
what the envisioned policy is for the (near) future and the envisioned im-
plications for the interest rates over different maturities and for different 
horizons.
III. The Role oft he Monetary Dialogue
The Monetary Dialogue has played an important role in the past and 
we envision a (potentially) more important role in the future. The panel 
of monetary and economic experts that have been submitting briefing 
papers for the Monetary Dialogue, have influenced the workings of the 
ECB in the past. A well known example is the publication of inflation 
10 An excellent overview can be found in “Forward Guidance Perspectives from 
Central Bankers, scholars and market participants” edited by Wouter den Haan 
(2013).
11 Woodford, Michael (2013), Forward Guidance by Inflation-Targeting Central 
Banks. Manuscript prepared for the conference “Two decades of inflation target-
ing” at the Sveriges Riskbank, June 2013.
12 An often cited study to demonstrate that statements (forward guidance) con-
tains information not related to the announced target value of the policy rate is 
Gurkaynak, R. / Sack, B. / Swanson, E. T. (2005) Do actions speak louder than 
words? The response of Asset Prices to Monetary Policy Actions and Statements. 
International Journal of Central Banking. This article has spurred a large follow-
up literature suggesting that statements indeed may matter. See for example 
 Eijffinger, S. / Mahieu, R. / Raes, L. (2011) Can the fed talk the hind legs off the 
stock market? CEPR working paper.
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projections by the ECB in December 2001 which was a response to the 
call by the Monetary Dialogue with the ECB president in 2000.13
With the increasing responsibilities of the ECB we feel that the Mone-
tary Dialogue will preserve it relevance. 
In the previous section we called for increased transparency with re-
spect to the procedural and policy dimension. When discussing the pro-
cedural disclosure and calling for more openness with respect to the de-
cision-taking process (publication of minutes and voting records) we 
mentioned that some feel that secrecy is warranted as to shield individ-
ual members from national pressures. Such a solution is aimed at a 
symptom and does not catch the underlying problem. Maybe it is time to 
rethink the design of the governing council (and executive board). As the 
ECB is maturing we feel that it may be warranted to rethink the institu-
tional design. While certainly not a pressing issue, we feel that it may be 
wise to start discussing this in time. In our opinion it is clear that we 
should evolve to a system with representation on a regional level, per-
haps with rotation (similar to Bank Presidents in the FOMC). Smaller 
economies could be represented by one vote (e. g. the Benelux countries) 
whereas large countries would be considered as a region on their own. 
Combined with a limited and non-renewable appointment national in-
fluences could be mitigated. We are open to other reform proposals. We 
only aim to start a debate on this matter. 
IV. Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that going forward, the ECB could and 
should improve with respect to its procedural and policy disclosure. 
The procedural disclosure can be improved by releasing minutes and 
voting records. With this call we support the proposal made by Jörg As­
mussen and Benoît Cœuré in the summer of 2013. Improving in this re-
spect would respond to an increased demand for transparency and ac-
countability.
The policy disclosure could be improved by providing more explicit 
and detailed forward guidance. Our proposal follows the lines set out by 
13 de Haan, J. / Eijffinger, S. / Waller, S. (2005), The European Central Bank: Cred-
ibility, transparency and centralization. Cesifo Book Series. P.94.
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others14 and calls for more concrete and explicit communication about 
the path of policy and the envisioned evolution of interest rates.
Finally we mentioned that as the ECB is maturing, it may be warrant-
ed to reconsider the institutional setup. 
Each aspect discussed above is feasible and in our opinion inevitable. 
The role of the Monetary Dialogue is to keep the debate going, also in the 
8th term of the European Parliament. 
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